

Message Text

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PAGE 01 STATE 102155

ORIGIN SS-25

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 SSO-00 /026 R

DRAFTED BY NEA/PAB:PWLANDE-NEA:ADUBS:SKG

APPROVED BY THE SECRETARY

P:PHABIB

S/S:S. GOLDSMITH

NEA: ALATHERTON

PM - MR. ERICSON

AID - MR. ADLER

-----050332Z 007885 /63

O 050300Z MAY 77

FM SECSTATE WASHDC

TO AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD IMMEDIATE

SECRET STATE 102155

EXDIS FOR CHARGE FROM SECRETARY

E.O. 11652: XGDS-3

TAGS: PFOR PK US

SUBJECT: SHORT-TERM STRATEGY TOWARD PAKISTAN

REF: (A) ISLAMABAD 4398, (B) ISLAMABAD 4385,

(C) ISLAMABAD 4194

1. DEPARTMENT APPRECIATES THE ANALYSES
AND POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS THAT YOU HAVE BEEN FORWARDING
IN LIGHT OF FAST-MOVING DEVELOPMENTS IN PAKISTAN.

A. IN THINKING ABOUT POSSIBLE REACTIONS TO BHUTTO'S CUR-
RENT BEHAVIOR, WE SHARE YOUR BASIC PREMISE THAT IT REMAINS
IN THE U.S. NATIONAL INTEREST TO MAINTAIN
PRODUCTIVE RELATIONS WITH PAKISTAN. THE MANY VARIABLES

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IN AND UNPREDICTABLE NATURE OF THE PRESENT INTERNAL SITUA-
TION IN PAKISTAN DICTATE THAT OUR STRATEGY CAN ONLY BE
SHORT-TERM UNTIL WE KNOW WHETHER WE WILL BE DEALING WITH
NEW GOVERNMENT OR WITH BHUTTO AND, IF LATTER, WHETHER HE
WILL NOW SEEK PUT LID ON HIS CURRENT ANTI-AMERICAN TACTIC
OR KEEP IT GOING.

B. IN ATTEMPTING TO ANALYZE BHUTTO'S MOTIVATIONS AT THE PRESENT TIME, WE CONCUR WITH EMBASSY'S OBSERVATION THAT HE IS GENERALLY MORE CONCERNED WITH SHORT-TERM POLITICAL ISSUES THAN WITH LONG-TERM CONSIDERATIONS. WHILE BHUTTO HAS BEEN IRRESPONSIBLE IN EXPLOITING HIS ANTI-AMERICAN ALLEGATIONS, HE ALSO SEEMS TO HAVE KEPT HIS OPTIONS OPEN. IF THIS IS THE CASE, WE CONCLUDE THAT WE SHOULD SEEK TO AVOID, OR AT LEAST TO MUTE, A PUBLIC CONFRONTATION WITH BHUTTO, PROVIDING HIM WITH THE MINIMUM NUMBER OF TARGETS WHICH HE MIGHT FEEL COMPELLED TO EXPLOIT IN THE CONTEXT OF HIS OWN DOMESTIC NEEDS AND REQUIREMENTS. WE PLAN FOR NOW TO AVOID ANY GENERAL PUBLIC STATEMENT ON BILATERAL RELATIONS TO THE EXTENT THIS IS POSSIBLE. WE WOULD PLAN, AS YOU RECOMMENDED, TO PROCEED WITH MILITARY ITEMS NOW IN THE PIPELINE WHILE DELAYING ACTIONS ON NEW SALES OR SIGNING NEW AID AGREEMENTS. AT THE SAME TIME, HOWEVER, WE WOULD LET BHUTTO KNOW PRIVATELY THAT GOOD RELATIONS ARE A TWO-WAY STREET AND THAT HE CANNOT EXPECT TO CONTINUE ATTACKING US GROUNDLESSLY WITHOUT THERE BEING AN ADVERSE IMPACT ON OUR RELATIONS. SUCH VIEWS, FOR EXAMPLE, WOULD BE THE KIND THAT I COULD CONVEY TO AZIZ AHMED IN BILATERAL TALKS THAT ARE SCHEDULED TO TAKE PLACE DURING THE CENTO MEETING. THIS REMAINS OUR VIEW DESPITE BHUTTO'S LETTER OF MAY 3.

C. IN SUM, UNTIL THE SITUATION IS CLARIFIED WE WOULD PREFER TO MAKE OUR CONCERN KNOWN PRIVATELY BOTH DIRECTLY AND THROUGH FRIENDS OF PAKISTAN SUCH AS IRAN AND SAUDI

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2. IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE FOREGOING THINKING, WE SET FORTH BELOW FURTHER VIEWS ON WHAT WE BELIEVE SHOULD BE DONE IN CONCRETE CASES, ON WHICH WE WOULD WELCOME YOUR COMMENTS.

A. MILITARY SALES. WE REALIZE THAT CONTINUING SHIPMENTS IN PIPELINE MAY BE PERCEIVED BY BOTH THE MILITARY AND THE OPPOSITION AS SIGNIFYING OUR PREPAREDNESS TO LIVE WITH BHUTTO REGARDLESS OF THE CHARGES HE MAKES AGAINST US. NEVERTHELESS, WE HAVE DECIDED TO CONTINUE TO PERMIT SUCH EXPORTS BOTH ON THE GROUNDS THAT BHUTTO WOULD CHOOSE TO INTERPRET AN EXPORT EMBARGO AS PROOF OF HIS CHARGES AND CONCERN THAT THE PAKISTAN MILITARY MIGHT MISINTERPRET SUCH AN ACTION AS AN INDICATION THAT THE USG HAD MADE A FUNDA-

MENTAL CHANGE IN POLICY TOWARDS PAKISTAN AND WOULD NO LONGER BE WILLING TO SUPPLY LEGITIMATE DEFENSIVE EQUIPMENT.

(WE ARE SENDING YOU BY SEPTEL A LIST OF FMS TRANSACTION SHIPMENTS WHICH ARE SCHEDULED FOR THE COMING MONTH.)

REQUESTS FOR NEW SALES AGREEMENTS SHOULD BE PROCESSED BY MISSION AT NORMAL BUT NOT EXPEDITIOUS PACE. FOR OUR PART, WE WILL MOVE CAUTIOUSLY ON FUTURE FMS CONTRACTS AS WELL AS MUNITIONS CONTROL LICENSES. WE WILL CONTINUE NOT TO PERMIT THE EXPORTATION OF EQUIPMENT WHICH IS CLEARLY DESIGNED FOR DOMESTIC POLITICAL SUPPRESSION PURPOSES.

WE CONCUR WITH THE EMBASSY'S RECOMMENDATION THAT THE LOA FOR COMMUNICATIONS EQUIPMENT NOT GO FORWARD TO CONGRESS AT THIS TIME. IF QUERIED BY GOP RE DELAY, WE WILL REPLY THAT WHILE PIPELINE ITEMS ARE CONTINUING, THIS LOA WILL

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B. ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE. WE CONCUR WITH YOUR RECOMMENDATION THAT ONGOING ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE PROGRAMS BE CONTINUED. WE ALSO CONCUR IN YOUR DECISION NOT TO PUSH THE GOP TO SPEED UP ITS INTERNAL CLEARANCE PROCESS ON VARIOUS PENDING PROJECTS. WE UNDERSTAND IT IS UNLIKELY THAT ANY NEW PROJECT WILL COME TO THE SIGNATURE STAGE IN THE NEAR FUTURE. IF A PROJECT DOES REACH THAT STAGE, WE WILL HAVE TO CONSIDER OUR POSITION AT THAT TIME. WHILE WE SEE NO NEED TO DISCUSS OVERALL ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE POLICY WITH THE GOP AT THIS TIME, IF THE SUBJECT ARISES, EMBOFFS SHOULD NOTE THE IMPLICATIONS OF THE SYMINGTON AMENDMENT FOR THIS PROGRAM.

C. P.L. 480. AS EMBASSY IS AWARE, WE HAVE RECENTLY SIGNED CCC CREDIT FOR 40,000 TONS VEGETABLE OIL. THE VEGETABLE OIL SUPPLY SITUATION IN THE U.S. HAS BECOME EXTREMELY TIGHT, AND ANY DECISION ON FUTURE TITLE I VEGETABLE OIL PROGRAMS IS LIKELY TO BE DELAYED. BANGLADESH HAS RECENTLY SOUGHT OUR ASSISTANCE ON A 40,000-TON PROGRAM. WHILE WE HAVE NOT REPLIED TO DACCA, IT IS LIKELY THAT THE LIMITED AMOUNTS OF VEGETABLE OIL AVAILABLE TO US AT THIS POINT WOULD BE ALLOCATED TO BANGLADESH, AS A COUNTRY WITH GREATER ECONOMIC NEEDS.

D. EXIMBANK FINANCING. WE CONCUR WITH YOUR RECOMMENDATION THAT WASHINGTON AGENCIES CONTINUE TO CONSIDER FINANCING OF EXPORTS TO PAKISTAN ON THE BASIS OF NORMAL COMMERCIAL CONSIDERATIONS.

E. MISCELLANEOUS. WE CONCUR WITH YOUR RECOMMENDATION THAT USIS PROGRAMS SHOULD BE MAINTAINED TO THE EXTENT THAT THIS CAN BE DONE AND THAT NARCOTICS PROGRAMS SHOULD BE DEVELOPED TO THE EXTENT THAT THE GOP IS WILLING TO DO SO.

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PAGE 01 STATE 102155 TOSEC 040245
ORIGIN SS-15

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 SSO-00 CCO-00 /016 R

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DRAFTED BY: NEA/PAB:PWLANDE/MW
APPROVED BY: NEA:EABINGTON
S/S:SSTEINER

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O 130006Z MAY 77 ZFF4
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO USDEL SECRETARY IMMEDIATE

S E C R E T STATE 102155 TOSEC 040245

EXDIS, SECDEL FOR ATHERTON

FOLLOWING TEL SENT ACTION ISLAMABAD FROM STATE MAY 05:

QUOTE S E C R E T STATE 102155

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VANCE UNQUOTE CHRISTOPHER

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22 May 2009
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